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PASSION: AN EsSAY ON PERSONALITY. By Roberto Mangabeira Un-
ger. New York: The Free Press. 1984. Pp. ix, 300. $14.95. 
Western philosophical thought has moved from the metaphysical 
to the nihilistic, and in Passion Roberto Unger wants to reconcile the 
two. Unger notes that "[t]wo great themes" comprise the focus of 
metaphysical "thought about personality": the central value of inter-
personal relationships, especially love, and the continuous assault on 
particular societies, to express the belief that human beings are inher-
ently unable to find perfect satisfaction on earth (p. 24). The first 
theme has not disappeared from human experience, claims Unger, for 
it is only through relationships with other free and "insatiable beings 
like ourselves" that we are able to find fulfillment (p. 25). But the 
second theme eliminates the possibility of discovering meaning in the 
real world, by positing instead an extra-human, ideal realm. Radical 
modernism, embracing the nihilistic, rescues the metaphysical tradi-
tion from viewing human existence as merely an earthly metaphor of 
an absent ideal, but just as it recognizes that we are what we make 
ourselves to be, radical modernism concludes wearily that "the indi-
vidual can expect no real progress" (p. 36) from such a continuous 
reshaping of the self. The possibility of discovering meaning on earth 
disappears altogether in this extreme skepticism. 
Roberto Unger, who teaches law and social theory at Harvard 
University, believes that a form of social life can be developed which 
will better enable us to become fully human, which to him means a 
society where institutions are structured primarily to promote per-
sonal freedom and change, and in Passion he points toward this goal in 
the realm of interpersonal relations. In an earlier article, The Critical 
exert power over poorer parties); Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. 
L. REv. 1276, 1295-96 (1984) ("Bureaucracy is ... a primary target for those who seek libera-
tion from modem forms of human domination. . • . Critical theory seeks to undermine" its 
existing legal basis and foster individual liberty.); Klare, Contracts Jurisprudence and the First-
Year Casebook, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 876, 896-98 (1979) (law cannot succeed unless it takes steps 
to reduce the influence of advantaged parties in "our highly stratified, class-dominated society"); 
Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REv. 753, 771-72 (1981) (contract law 
cannot accommodate true freedom without rejecting the premises of present law). 
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Legal Studies Movement, 1 Unger described this goal in the field of 
legal systems; in a reported forthcoming work, he will do so in social 
theory. Unger recognizes that the "systematic shift in the character of 
direct personal relations"2 which he discusses in Passion "need[s] to be 
thought out in legal categories and protected by legal rights,"3 a task 
he began undertaking in The Critical Legal Studies Movement. "[N]ot 
to give these reconstructed forms of solidarity and subjectivity institu-
tional support would be . . . merely to abandon them to entrenched 
forms of human connection at war with our ideals."4 Likewise, an 
"indispensable counterpart to a psychology of empowerment" (p. 75), 
which Unger describes as enabling people to discover novel ways of 
relating with others (p. 73), "is a social theory capable of describing 
the forms of social life that advance the practical, passionate, and cog-
nitive forms of empowerment" (p. 75), which Unger undoubtedly will 
elaborate in his forthcoming social theory. But the discussions oflegal 
systems and social theory are in a sense secondary, for they depend 
upon a notion of what it means to be a human being, a notion which is 
expounded in Passion. 
Although he accepts the modernist conception that people are de-
fined by their" social and historical contexts, Unger's view of what it 
means to be a human being cuts across specific social and historical 
barriers and consists of a universal claim: all human beings - no 
matter when or where they live - must cope with the tension between 
our need for and our fear of one another, which Unger calls "the prob-
lem of solidarity" (p. 4). "Passion" is "the living out" of this tension 
(p. 115), which, though unresolvable, is eased to varying degrees by 
the many different passions (p. 125). Much of the book involves de-
scriptions of these passions, detailing their relative successes and fail-
ures in alleviating the conflict between our need for and fear of each 
other. 
In Unger's hierarchy of passions, it is love which best allows us to 
embrace others without apprehension: 
Love is an impulse toward acceptance of the other person, less in his 
distinctive physical and moral traits (which the lover may criticize and 
devalue) than in his whole individuality. The specific features of the per-
son are never irrelevant - how else could you know him? - but they 
are taken as incarnations of a self that both speaks through them and 
transcends them. This acceptance, made in the face of the inexorably 
hidden and threatening being of another person, always has something of 
the miraculous. It is an act of grace devoid of condescension or resent-
ment. [P. 221.]5 
1. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. RE.v. 561 (1983). 
2. Id. at 598. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Both Freud and Hegel appear to have influenced Unger's discussion of love: 
770 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:750 
For Unger, when we love, we break down defenses, vulnerabilities, 
socially circumscribed barriers to appreciating other people. As we 
ourselves learn to play with the possibilities of being human, as we 
discover a multiplicity of ways of reinventing and recombining the ele-
ments that make up our otherwise unchanging character, we begin to 
see that other people are like us because they can do the same. 
Although we cannot reach an extra-human Utopia, we can find images 
of that ideal realm in our own lives by recognizing and uncovering the 
infinite possibilities that human freedom can provide. Thus, in Un-
ger's view, the form of social life which would best enable us to be-
come fully human is that form which is most malleable, which we see 
as itself contingent. This form leaves us the greatest room for play: 
An order must be invented that, considered from one standpoint, mini-
mizes the obstacles to our experiments in problem-solving and in ac-
cepted vulnerability and, viewed from another perspective, multiplies the 
instruments and opportunities for its own revision. Such an order repre-
sents the next best thing to the unconditional context whose unavailabil-
ity helps make us what we are. Its characterological form is a central 
concern of this inquiry . . . . [P. 193.]6 
A crude but helpful description of Unger's best society would un-
derstand it as procedural rather than substantive. That is, the best 
society is one in which we can most easily open ourselves to others 
with the least amount of fear - this society is best because of how it 
enables us to act, not what it enables us to be. 7 Unger is careful, 
though, in both Passion and The Critical Legal Studies Movement, to 
disassociate his theory from theories of abrupt and violent revolution, 
which are only necessary to shatter the harsh intransigence of a society 
which fails to allow for change. Unger's best society would contain 
Normally, there is nothing of which we are more certain than the feeling of our self, of our 
own ego. This ego appears to us as something autonomous and unitary, marked off dis-
tinctly from everything else. • • . [T]owards the outside . • • the ego seems to maintain 
clear and sharp lines of demarcation. There is only one state • . • in which it does not do 
this. At the height of being in love the boundary between ego and object threatens to melt 
away. Against all the evidence of his senses, a man who is in love declares that 'I' and 'you' 
are one, and is prepared to behave as if it were a fact. 
s. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 12-13 (J. Strachey ed. 1961) (footnotes omit-
ted). See also G. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT~ 184, at 112 (A. Miller trans. 1977) 
(emphasis in original): 
[Self-consciousness] is aware that it at once is, and is not, another consciousness, and equally 
that this other is for itself only when it supersedes itself as being for itself, and is for itself 
only in the being-for-self of the other ••.. They recognize themselves as mutually recogniz· 
ing one another. 
6. The legal aspect of this possible order is described in The Critical Legal Studies Movement 
as "deviationist doctrine." Unger, supra note 2, at 576-83. This "enlarged doctrine" 
is the legal-theoretical concomitant to a social theory [and a theory of interpersonal rela-
tions] that sees transformative possibilities built into the very mechanisms of social stabiliza· 
tion and that refuses to explain the established forms of society, or the sequence of these 
forms in history, as primarily reflecting practical or psychological imperatives. 
Id. at 583. 
7. Cf J. CoNRAD, LoRD JIM 212-15 (Stein discussing "how to be"). 
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self-corrective mechanisms because its inhabitants would see it as a 
laboratory for possibilities of human interaction, and be ready to laugh 
at rather than defend a failed program. 
That Unger's best society would be a place of playfulness and 
laughter is, however, only implicit in Passion, and Unger's failure to 
describe the mirthfulness of the world of love exemplifies the specula-
tive tone that marks the central failure of the work as a whole. For 
although Unger claims that his mode of discourse will be that of the 
storyteller (p. 84), his stories are more generic than specific. He dis-
cusses, abstractly, lust, despair, hatred, vanity, jealousy, envy, faith, 
hope, and love, without once posing a hypothetical tale to situate the 
discussion in the lives of real or imagined people. 8 Only once, when he 
embarks upon a "biographical genealogy of the passions" (p. 147), 
does Unger move toward a specific example. His lovely discussion of 
the development of the passionate self9 reminds one substantively of 
Piaget's description of the development of the child, 10 but even here 
Unger is rarely able to tell real tales.11 
Unger also tends to think dualistically; the cornerstone of Passion 
is itself a dichotomy, that of our mutual longing for and fear of each 
other. But Unger would probably acknowledge that his method of 
thought is not meant to imply an ontological assertion. Unger recog-
nizes that although we often discuss our relations by reducing them to 
easily graspable conceptual categories, our relations themselves are 
complex and not dualistic. 
The publication of Passion seems to mark an important moment in 
post-modernist thought. Although human is all we can be, we none-
theless yearn for more, and the post-modernist task is to find represen-
tations of the infinite in the real. The most fertile ground for such 
representations is humanity itself. We cannot reach godliness, but as 
Roberto Unger's Passion so trenchantly demonstrates, we can reach 
each other, if only we can learn to overcome who we are and envision 
the possibilities of who we might become. 
8. For examples of helpful story-telling in philosophical discourse, see J. SARTRE, BEING 
AND NOTHINGNESS 40-42, 96-98, 101-03 (H. Barnes trans. 1956). For further elaboration of this 
feature ofUnger's work, see Teachout, Book Review, 83 MICH. L. REv. 849, 883-90 (1985) (in 
this issue). 
9. For example, when Unger describes a child's "beginning of reflection upon contingency -
the discovery that things might be otherwise," p. 154, he first writes of a child's crying for his 
parents. Then Unger widens his interpretive focus to incorporate in the crying the child's devel-
oping though still unconscious sense of his mortality: "If only he could think more clearly, he 
would not stop crying when father comes home." P. 154. 
10. See generally THE EssENTIAL PIAGET (H. Gruber & J. Voneche eds. 1977). 
11. Unger's description of the turnllig points in the development of the passionate self is 
general rather than specific. That is, Unger rarely sets forth a hypothetical situation to represent 
a larger idea. 
